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Abstract
In the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about whether to interact
with other individuals in the population. In this paper, we instead consider reputation-based conditional interaction and its
consequences for the evolution of cooperation. Each individual has a tolerance range, and only interacts with other
individuals whose reputation lies within its tolerance range in a chosen sample of the population. Reputation contains
information about the number of interaction partners an individual has just cooperated with. We find that the introduction
of conditional interaction promotes cooperation in well-mixed populations, and there exist moderate tolerance ranges for
which this effect is maximized. For a given tolerance range, there is a critical cost-to-benefit ratio below which cooperation
can be promoted. Interestingly, we find that if cooperation evolves, different cooperators’ interaction clusters are typically
maintained in the population, each around a different reputation level. We further investigate some properties of these
cooperators’ clusters. Moreover, we examine the effects of the sample number on the evolution of cooperation. Our results
highlight the importance of the detailed consideration of modes of interaction for the evolution of cooperation in well-
mixed populations.
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Introduction
How to understand the emergence of cooperation is a central
problem in evolutionary biology [1–3]. Evolutionary game theory
has become a powerful framework to study this problem [4]. The
prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) is often employed for this purpose
[5].
In the PDG framework, a cooperator is an individual who pays
a cost c that leads to the other individual receiving a benefit b,
while a defector pays no cost and provides no benefit. In the
evolutionary PDG, cost and benefit are measured in terms of
payoffs, which are interpreted as reproductive success. In general,
the strategy of someone who receives a higher payoff is more likely
to be successfully reproduced/propagated [2]. In order for
cooperation to increase in a population, cooperative individuals
must receive higher payoffs than non-cooperative individuals,
which occurs provided cooperators benefit from cooperative acts
of others more often than non-cooperative individuals. In other
words, there must be positive assortment between cooperative
types for cooperation to evolve [5–8].
In a well-mixed PDG, all individuals are equally likely to
interact with each other (no assortment), defectors have a higher
average payoff than unconditional cooperators. Therefore, the
relative abundance of defectors increases via natural selection, and
drives cooperators to extinction [4,9–11]. In this simple form of
PDG, each individual deterministically interacts with all other
individuals in the population or with a representative sample of the
population. Thus, individuals do not have a choice whether or not
to interact with other individuals.
In natural systems, individuals do not always deterministically
interact with others in a population. Nor do they interact purely
stochastically (as studied in [12–15]). A more realistic mode of
interaction may be that of selective interaction [16]. Here, we aim
to incorporate this selective interaction mode into the well-mixed
evolutionary PDG. Individuals’ reputation is a universal and
intuitive feature of human society as well as other natural systems,
and can be used by other individuals as a selection criterion [17].
Logically, players prefer to interact with others having a high
reputation over those with a lower reputation [18], but social
tolerance [19] will permit interactions with those having non-high
reputation in some cases. They generally have a certain tolerance
range, and will myopically interact with those whose reputation is
within this range, so that two players can interact only if their
reputation levels are both within the other’s tolerance range due to
the mutually myopic selections. In this study, we consider the
combination of reputation and tolerance range to define the mode
of interaction for paired players, and call it conditional interaction.
In previous reputation-based [20–24] or tag-based [17,25–27]
models, individuals take into consideration the reputations or tags
of their opponents to decide whether to cooperate or to defect.
The reputation here is used to help individuals choose interaction
partners. In fact, information regarding individuals’ reputation can
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e36260be used as a selection parameter for partner choice [28], further
justifying the use of reputation in our model.
In general, an individual’s reputation level is a function of its
behavior, increasing with cooperation. As we notice in human
society, people are associated with a higher reputation the more
they help, or cooperate. In our study, individuals engage in
pairwise interactions with others using unconditional strategies,
but since the interaction itself is conditional on reputation,
different individuals may have different numbers of pairwise
interactions. Thus, a cooperator’s number of interaction partners
could have a strong influence on its reputation. This is taken into
account in the adjustment of individuals’ reputation so that
players’ reputation can only be assessed after all the possible
interactions are carried out [23].
An individual’s tolerance range is an important parameter,
which can help individuals determine their interaction partners. In
this study, we mainly examine the effects of tolerance range on the
evolution of cooperation in the well-mixed PDG. Intriguingly, we
find that moderate tolerance ranges are most beneficial for
cooperation in well-mixed populations. Furthermore, for cooper-
ation to evolve, distinct clusters of cooperators are maintained in
the population that do not interact with each other.
Results
First, we fix the sample size k~N{1~499, and study the
cooperation level as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r for four
different values of the tolerance range h, as shown in Fig. 1(a). We
see that for each value of h, full cooperation is achieved when r is
small, which is different from previous findings that cooperators
easily vanish even for very small r in a well-mixed population
[4,11]. This is mainly because that the introduced conditional
interaction promotes cooperation, although cooperators still
become rapidly extinct as r becomes large. Moreover, we notice
that, for some fixed r [e.g., r~0:7, see the dotted line in Fig. 1(a)],
the cooperation level for moderate h~0:15 is higher than the
cooperation level for other values of h, e.g., h~0:05 and 0.35. This
suggests that there exist some optimal intermediate h promoting
cooperation.
In order to examine the effect of h more precisely, we study the
cooperation level rc as a function of h for various r as shown in
Fig. 1(b). Interestingly, we find that for the smaller values of r,
there is a moderate region of h resulting in a plateau of full
cooperation. When h is beyond this region, the cooperation level
decreases sharply. The size of this plateau decreases with
increasing r, and finally vanishes. Even when the plateau of full
cooperation is absent, there still exists an optimal h leading to the
maximal cooperation level [e.g., for r~0:75 in Fig. 1(b)]. Our
results show that such a conditional interaction can provide a
positive effect on the promotion of cooperation, which can be
restricted by increasing r.
It is worth noting that for each value of h, there exists a critical
cost-to-benefit ratio rc below which cooperation can be promoted.
We have determined the critical values rc by means of systematic
MC simulations, and the results are summarized in Fig. 2. Clearly,
we see that rc reaches its maximum value at about h~0:10, and rc
tends to zero if h goes to one.
To explain the non-monotonous dependence of rc on h, we first
consider the boundary cases. For h?1, each individual uncondi-
tionally interacts with others, and our model recovers the
traditional evolutionary PDG model in well-mixed populations.
Therefore, defectors can easily take over all the population. For
h?0, defectors generally have bad reputations and their
reputation differences are very slight, hence they do not restrict
to interact with each other. Whereas the differences between
cooperators’ reputation levels can easily exceed small h, so that
most cooperators are not permitted to interact with each other. As
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Figure 1. Promotion of cooperation due to reputation-based
conditional interaction. Panel (a) shows the cooperation level as a
function of r for different values of h. Panel (b) shows the cooperation
level as a function of h for different values of r. It can be observed that
cooperation can evolve even for large value of r in the mode of
conditional interaction, and there exist intermediate tolerance ranges
leading to the optimal cooperation level. Here, k is set to N{1~499:
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036260.g001
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Figure 2. The critical cost-to-benefit ratio rc as a function of
h. Cooperation can be promoted when the cost-to-benefit ratio is less
than the corresponding critical value, and rc reaches its maximum value
at about h~0:10: Parameters are the same as those in Fig. 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036260.g002
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by interacting with each other more often than with defectors, and
naturally they are easily wiped out.
As h departs from zero, the differences between some
cooperators’ reputation levels begin to fall within the value of h.
Thus, cooperators are permitted to interact with some other
cooperators [see Fig. 3(a)], resulting in a positive feedback
mechanism that enhances the reputation and payoff of coopera-
tors. As time t increases, the fraction of individuals having small
reputation decreases, and the fraction of individuals having high
reputation increases [see Fig. 3(b)]. Interactions among defectors,
and interactions between defectors and cooperators are both
diminished (see Fig. 3). Importantly, cooperators gradually form
stable interaction clusters, where they have very similar reputation
levels [see Fig. 3(b)], so that positive assortment between
cooperators can be achieved within such clusters, and cooperation
can be promoted even in well-mixed populations.
Furthermore, in Fig. 3(b) when the system reaches the absorbing
state, i.e., full cooperation, we note that there are still different
levels of reputation maintained in the population. This means that
even though the population consists of cooperators only, not all
individuals, interact, i.e., cooperate, with all other individuals in
the population [see Fig. 3(a)]. In other words, the population is
segregated into different cooperation clusters, within which
cooperation occurs, but between which there is no cooperation.
According to the assessment rule, an individual’s reputation not
only depends on its strategy, but also depends on the pairwise
interaction number. Hence, even if all the individuals choose to
cooperate, separate reputation clusters can be maintained in the
population. Moreover, we check that reputation clusters can still
emerge which promotes the evolution of cooperation for moderate
values of tolerance range, in the condition of other initial
assignments of reputations.
Some properties of these cooperators’ clusters at equilibrium are
shown in Fig. 4. We show the average number of cooperators’
clusters  N Nc as a function of h in Fig. 4(a). For initial 50% C  N Nc first
increases monotonously until reaching the maximum value at
about h~0:10, and then decreases with increasing h. This hump-
shaped dependence can be understood when comparing the
number of clusters emerging in populations that are initialized
with only cooperators [red dots in Fig. 4(a)]. In that case,  N Nc
decreases monotonously with increasing h, and as is intuitively
clear, for small tolerances h cooperators would be divided into
more and smaller interaction clusters. However, for small h
defectors can invade and dominate the population (see Fig. 1),
which generates the hump shown in the black dots in Fig. 4(a). In
Fig. 4(b) we study the probability distribution of Nc with different
intermediate values of h for initial 50% C. When full cooperation is
achieved there are always at least 2 cooperators’ clusters
maintained in the population, and for smaller intermediate h
larger Nc is maintained with a higher probability. Individuals from
different cooperative clusters do not interact with each other, but
all have the same strategic genotype. These results may reflect the
phenomenon of segregation in human society [29–32], where
individuals who are otherwise genetically similar enough to
interact (both cooperators, for example) do not interact with a
portion of others in the same community or geographical location
based on some types of behavioural tag.
Finally, we examine the effect of the sample size k on the
evolution of cooperation. As shown in Fig. 5, we find that for
hv0:45, especially for h lying in the optimal region, the smaller
the sample number is, the lower the cooperation level is. With
smaller sample numbers, an additional source of stochasticity is
incorporated into individual payoff assignment, which can result in
a negative effect on the evolution of cooperation. But the finite
population analogue of replicator dynamics we adopted may
dismiss some stochastic effects from weak selection [12,15]. As a
result, the nontrivial dependence of cooperation level on the
tolerance range does not change qualitatively with the sample
number.
Discussion
Reputation is used as a phenotypic feature for selective
interactions in our model, and such reputation-based selective
interactions differ from previous explicit ones [2,20–24]. In
general, indirect reciprocity works through reputation. Individuals
choose to cooperate or to defect, depending on the recipient’s
reputation and their own, and those with high reputation are more
likely to receive help from others. In our model, it is only when
individuals determine whether to participate that they consider the
opponent’s reputation and ones own, and they play the same
strategy with all interaction partners. Individuals’ reputation
generates phenotypic assortment for preferential interactions. In
particular, cooperators maintain a non-zero reputation level, while
the reputation of defectors decreases to zero. This generates the
positive assortment between cooperators necessary for the
maintenance of cooperation.
Our assessment rule gives individuals a reputation that varies
from zero to one, which differentiates the players in the well-mixed
populations. It is interesting to note that even if cooperation
dominates, not all cooperative individuals have the same
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Figure 3. Average interaction cooperator numbers and repu-
tation distribution in the population. Panel (a) depicts the average
interaction cooperator numbers of a cooperator (ICC) and a defector
(IDC) as a function of time step t. Panel (b) depicts the contour plot of
reputation distribution in the population drawn as a function of time
step t. It can be observed that during the evolutionary process different
cooperators’ clusters are typically maintained in the population, leading
to interaction segregation in purely cooperative populations. Here,
h~0:15, r~0:60, and other parameters are the same as those in Fig. 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036260.g003
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based on different reputation levels, with cooperative interactions
taking place within clusters, but not between different clusters.
Such cluster formation within populations consisting entirely of
cooperators does not seem to have been observed in previous
reputation-based studies [2,20–24]. But interestingly, such similar
finding has been experimentally demonstrated in other relevant
works regarding in-group favoritism [29–32], where cooperators
only help others in their group. In this sense, our work
complements and confirms previous results by introducing such
a reputation-based conditional interaction rule. Moreover, it is
worth pointing out this assessment rule of reputation is set by only
taking into account some limited factors. In fact, based on this
assessment rule, some more factors (e.g., an individual’s reputation
should keep decreasing after playing as a defector in some
interactions) can be incorporated into the evaluation of reputation,
which could be further helpful in studying the evolution of
cooperation in more realistic systems.
Because the reputation of individuals in our model can be seen
as a kind of tag, our model is related to the considerable body of
work on tag-based cooperation, according to which cooperators
prefer to help others with similar tags [17,25–27,33–37]. In
general, those tag-based selective interactions are based on fixed
tags, and often a result of self-similarity mechanism in nature.
Individuals (or altruists) play a conditional strategy in the
framework of compulsory participation: they cooperate with all
individuals who are close enough in tag space and defect
otherwise. This selective interaction between similar players is
active. Whereas the conditional interaction rule in our model
results from individuals’ respective preferences, so that individuals
passively interact with others having similar and dynamical
reputation level by using pure strategies. In addition, the
phenotypic (heritable) signals in tag-based models are possibly less
reliable [27,33]. Defectors may detect this tag, and destroy the tag-
based cooperation. Presently, individuals’ reputation is adjustable
based on past actions, which could facilitate preferential assort-
ment. In particular, cooperators’ reputation can become very
similar with some others’ at moderate tolerance range. The
positive correlation between reputation and moderate tolerance
range leads to positive assortment between cooperative types–the
basic mechanism that promotes cooperation [5–8]. Noticeably, we
also show that in contrast to previous related works [34,36], this
promotion does not need the additional requirement of spatial
population distribution.
The parameter h in our models could be used to characterize
the strength of individuals’ rationality at choosing interaction
partners. For h?0, individuals only tend to interact with those
having higher reputation levels, demonstrating a rational perfor-
mance; whereas for h?1, individuals unconditionally interact with
other individuals, performing randomly. It is important to
emphasize that such kind of rationality is mainly based on
individuals’ reputation information, rather than payoff informa-
tion. Indeed, the bounded rationality of individuals has been taken
into account in the dynamics of games in real systems, and may
have different forms [17]. For example, in [38–43], a stochastic
Fermi function evolutionary rule is presented to capture the
bounded rationality of individuals. Here we capture the bounded
rationality of individuals in another sophisticated situation, and we
find that this different form of bounded rationality is beneficial for
the altruistic behavior, consistent with previous results [39,40]. In
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Figure 4. Average number of cooperators’ reputation clusters
and their probability distribution. Panel (a) shows the average
number of cooperators’ reputation clusters  N Nc as a function of h for two
different initial strategy distributions. Panel (b) shows probability
distribution of cooperators’ reputation cluster numbers Nc with
different values of h for initial 50% C. For initial 50% C, the cluster
number reaches its maximum value at about h~0:10 which optimally
promotes cooperation. Whereas for initial 100% C, the cluster number
decreases with increasing the tolerance range. Here, r~0:6 and other
parameters are the same as those in Fig. 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036260.g004
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Figure 5. The cooperation level as a function of h for different
representative sample size k of the population. We fix r~0:6
here, and find that the nonmonotonous dependence of cooperation
level on the tolerance range does not change qualitatively with the
sample number and have checked that the main results can still emerge
for other values of r.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036260.g005
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rationality can become a beneficial characteristic in understanding
cooperative behavior in the real world [17].
We observe that individuals are constrained to interact with few
others, and cooperators’ interaction clusters can be formed. These
observations are conceptually analogous to the ones in games on
graphs, where individuals are constrained to interact with few
others along the edges [44–46]. Furthermore, there are some
cooperators with high reputation during the evolutionary process,
who act as hub cooperators in heterogeneous networks [47–51]:
they can help others more, resist the exploitation by defectors, and
breed other potential cooperators in the population. By means of
this analogy, we further confirm that an optimal environment for
the evolution of cooperation is warranted by the middle range of
tolerance.
It is noteworthy that our approach bears some similarity with
game models about the coevolution of strategy and network
structure (see [52,53] for review papers), albeit presently only the
interaction network is dynamical. Individuals can have different
and dynamical pairwise interaction numbers by this mode of
selective interaction. In particular, individuals will refuse to
participate in the interactions if they are dissatisfied with their
parters. This similar feature has been reflected in some previous
works about evolutionary games in dynamical networks. For
example, in [54] if a player is dissatisfied with the interaction, then
it competes with the partner to rewire the link; and in [55]
undesired links (the links between cooperators and defectors) break
fasters under the proposed active linking rule. Under this
approach, dynamical heterogeneous interactions emerge in the
well-mixed populations, and allow cooperation to spread at
moderate tolerance range. Moreover, some individuals may be
isolated by all others, and become interaction loners. However, the
loner here is not a strategy choice and does not arise voluntarily
[56,57].
In summary, we have presented a conditional interaction rule in
the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma game, which combines
individuals’ social tolerance range with reputation information to
help individuals choose interaction partners. We have mainly
studied the effects of tolerance range on the evolution of
cooperation. Interestingly, we found that there exist optimal
moderate tolerance ranges leading to the highest levels of
cooperation, and the conditional interaction rule can be helpful
in solving the problem of cooperation in well-mixed populations.
Furthermore, we obtained the critical cost-to-benefit ratio below
which cooperation can be promoted for each value of tolerance
range. Also, we found that when cooperation evolves, different
cooperators’ clusters are typically maintained in the population,
leading to interaction segregation in purely cooperative popula-
tions. When full cooperation is achieved, there are always at least
two cooperators’ clusters presenting in the population, and the
number of different cooperation clusters appears to be maximal
near the tolerance range that optimally promotes cooperation.
Thus, our model not only shows that conditional interaction is an
alternative way to solve the problem of cooperation through
assortment, but also suggests a mechanism for generating
interaction segregation within cooperative populations. In future
work, it would be interesting to consider these mechanisms in
other evolutionary games, e.g. in the snowdrift game [5], and to
consider the evolutionary dynamics of tolerance levels.
Materials and Methods
Consider the evolutionary PDG in a well-mixed population with
size N. Each individual x can either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
The strategy of player x is denoted by Sx, where Sx~1
corresponds to the strategy C, and Sx~0 to the strategy D.
Following previous works [44,58], we adopt the rescaled payoff
matrix depending on one single parameter so that the problem can
be simplified
CD
C
D
10
1zrr
 !
,
ð1Þ
where r~c=b represents the cost-to-benefit ratio. It is worth
pointing out that the qualitative results do not change if we adopt
other forms of payoff matrix for PDG [48,59].
In well-mixed populations, each player chooses a representative
sample of the population as the possible interaction partners in
each generation [15]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
there are k (1%kƒN{1) individuals in the chosen subset of the
population. Note that if k~N{1, each individual has the
opportunity to interact with all others in the population at each
generation.
Then, player x will compare its current reputation with player
y’s in the chosen sample of the population. It will be willing to
interact with player y, if player y’s reputation is within its tolerance
range, that is,
Rx{hƒRy,
where Rx (Ry) is the current reputation level of player x (y), and h is
the tolerance range of player x. In this study, we assume that each
player has the same tolerance range. Similarly, player y will be
willing to interact with player x if Ry{hƒRx: As a result, only
when DRx{RyDƒh, player x can interact with player y, and obtain
the payoff from the game.
According to the above interaction rule, player x chooses its
interaction partners from the sample of the population, and
collects its payoff Px by using strategy Sx,
Px~SxIcz(1{Sx)½Ic(1zr)z(Ix{Ic)r , ð2Þ
where Ix is the number of player x’s interaction partners, Ic is the
number of cooperators among the interaction partners, and
IcƒIxƒk:
Following the interactions with the sample of the population,
player x’s reputation level is adjusted, and its updated reputation
level, Rx(t), is a weighted combination of its previous level at time
t{1 and its actions taken against interaction partners at t.
Formally,
Rx(t)~(1{a)Rx(t{1)zaSx
Ix(t)
k
, ð3Þ
where 0vav1 is a weighting factor. For a?1, individuals’
reputation depends only on the present interactions. For a?0,
individuals’ reputation is unchanged. Without loss of generality,
the second term in Eq. (3) is normalized (divided by the number of
the sample k), and is a measure of how much player x cooperated
with others. In this study, the reputation level for N agents is
initially random and can vary between 0 and 1, and correspond-
ingly the tolerance rang is set to 0vhv1:
Following the reassignment of reputation levels, player x selects
another player y randomly from the entire population for strategy
updating. Whenever PywPx, it will adopt the selected individual
Conditional Interaction Supports Cooperation
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W~
Py{Px
M
, ð4Þ
where M ensures the proper normalization and is given by the
maximum possible difference between the payoffs of x and y.I ti s
important to point out that the selection under such strategy
update rule is strong and can dismiss some stochastic effects, so
that we can focus more forcefully on the effects of the reputation-
based conditional interactions.
In this study, we set a~0:5, and investigate the effects of h on
the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, we have checked that the
main results remain unaffected qualitatively when changing a
within realistic limits.
We study this model by Monte Carlo (MC) simulations, which
are carried out in the well-mixed population with size N~500:
Initially, the two strategies of C and D are randomly distributed
among the population with an equal probability, and individuals’
reputation levels are randomly distributed within the interval ½0,1 :
Under stochastic dynamics, the population will inevitably
converge to one of the two possible absorbing states: 100%
cooperators or 100% defectors [54,60]. In our study, we run 500
independent simulations for each set of parameters, and compute
the fraction of times that the system evolves to 100% cooperators
as the cooperation level rc: However, we find that the time for
reaching an absorbing state may be prohibitively long for certain
sets of parameters. If the population does not converge to an
absorbing state after 106 generations, the cooperation level is
determined by the average fraction of cooperators in the
population over the last 103 generations. Furthermore, we
implement this computational model with synchronous updates
[46].
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